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ABSTRACT: The history and politics of the Middle-East are often understood as a 
battle-field where various religious currents and ethnic factions are constantly 
struggling for hegemony. In contrast, in this paper I argue that this history and 
politics is better understood as a struggle between two competing world-views or 
political theologies: the exclusionary world-view of Jihad on the one hand, and the 
inclusive world-view of Muqawamah, on the other. Focusing on Hizballah in 
Lebanon as my case-study, I show how this Islamic movement has traded a 
discourse that emphasizes Jihad, to one that emphasizes resistance. By so doing, I 
argue, Hizballah's discourse of resistance provided a common-ground for 
cooperation with other forces and groups on the local, regional, and global scene. 
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The Arab Spring is long gone. Seasons have turned, spring gave way to fall, 
and a great emancipatory hope has been traded for tens of thousands of 
victims who were killed across the Arab World. The current Syrian civil war 
is probably the most extreme example of the bloody aftermath of the Arab 
Spring. Ironically enough, at the heart of this war, two groups that Israel 
and the West have always considered terrorist forces with the same agenda 
are now combating each other in this civil war. These two groups are 
Hizballah and the resistance forces on the one hand, and the Takfiri and the 
Sunni Jihadist movements, somewhat related to Al-Qaeda, on the other. 
While it is tempting to regard this conflict as one between different 
religious fractions or ethnic groups, in this essay, I will attempt to provide 
a different framework for understanding the Middle Eastern conflict in 
general, and the Syrian and Lebanese conflicts in particular. I will do so by 
focusing on the case of Hizballah in Lebanon, and argue that this movement 
has undergone a transformation in the way it presents itself, by switching 
from the discourse of Jihad to that of Muqawamah. 
 
 
Hizballah and the Takfiri Movements 
 
An innocent observer of the Middle-Eastern scene would be confused upon 
seeing the merciless confrontation between Islamists of different factions. 
Both parties to this conflict fight in the name of the Islamic political slogan 
that calls for submission to the law of God and his Messenger in one Islamic 
state, where Shari’a is the state law. This innocent observer might conclude 
that the current wars in Syria, Lebanon, and to a certain extent in Iraq, are 
merely sectarian wars, in which the Sunnis stand against the Shiites and 
other minorities in these countries, including the Alawites and Christian 
minorities. But far from being all closely-related fractions of Islam, which 
stand for similar worldviews, these Islamic movements in fact have 
developed from very different origins. Moreover, the theoretical 
background of Hizballah-like movements is utterly different to that of 
Islamic Takfiri and ”Jihadist” movements.  
Hizballah and the Islamic Takfiri movements operating in Lebanon 
and Syria differ not only in their historical development, but also in the 
reasons that have led to their foundation. Both these two very different 
“Islamic movements”, however, operate in Lebanon, the most politically, 
religiously, ethnically and socially diversified arena in the Arab World, and 
the one that has also maintained the flames of the Arab-Israeli conflict high 
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throughout the 1970s and the 1980s. Hizballah is characterized, especially 
in its later phase, by tolerance and a willingness to compromise, negotiate 
and collaborate with the other forces in order to achieve common goals. In 
contrast, the Takfiri and Wahhabi movements and parties that emerged in 
closed surroundings, and are still sponsored by the Saudi regime. These 
movements took root in different parts of the Arab and Islamic world 
including Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Palestine, despite the fact that 
these countries’ social diversity makes them unnatural habitats for such 
radical movements. 
The Jihadist movements, in their new format, were established on the 
Afghan territories in opposition to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 
the 1980s. Upon the completion of the mission assigned to these young men, 
many have returned to their homelands and have instigated an internal 
Jihad, within the boundaries of the homeland. Their Jihad against foreign 
Soviet intervention, that was supported by other foreign regimes such as 
the United States, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, was directed toward the 
“infidel” nation-state. This gave rise to organizations ideologically inspired 
by radical Salafi jurisprudence, that regards all nation-states that follow 
man-made law rather than their interpretation of Islamic law, as pagan and 
infidel. These ideas were formulated by Sayyid Qutb, a key Islamic theorists 
of these movements, whose theories were based on the writings of Ibn 
Tayimyyah (especially his Fatawas), dating back to the 14th century.  
It is well known that this approach refuses to comprise with other 
forces operating within these states. This approach is made clear in the 
following passage, from Sayyid Qutb’s Ma'alim a’la al-Tariq (Milestones): 
 
 The first step in our path is to surpass the pagan society, its value 
and perceptions, without modifying any of our values and 
perceptions in order to achieve compromise… if we renounce any 
step, we will lose our doctrine and our way” (Qutb 1979, 81). 1 
 
From the point of view of these movements, all existing Islamic societies are 
“pagan” and should be fought against. As Sami Zubaida puts it, referring 
to the Wahhabi movement which is the source of the Jihadist movements of 
the 20th and the 21st centuries: “…the first targets of Wahhabi Jihads were 
Sunni Muslims who, by virtue of following other paths of religion, were 
deemed infidels and confronted with violence.” (Zubaida, 2015, 143). 
Therefore, these movements direct their attention, efforts and activism 
against their own states, and raise the banner of Jihad against these regimes, 
especially if they are secular, or with secular orientation. They even go as 
far as acting against other Islamic movements that are opposed to the 
Jihadist Salafi movements, like Hizballah in Lebanon. 
                                                          
1 All the passages quoted in this paper were translated by Ms. Ruba Simaan. 
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 Before getting into more detail about the different foundations of the 
Muqawamah and the Jihadist movements, it is important to understand the 
etymological and historical roots of these two terms, that play a crucial role 






The word “Jihad” derives from the Arabic root ج.ه.د. According to the 
encyclopedic dictionary Lisan al-‘Arab, its meaning is Juhd, that is, effort, 
activity or diligence (Ibn Manzour). “Mujahid” is the person who makes or 
invests efforts. Another word that derives from the same root is 
“Mujtahid”- an Islamic cleric working diligently on the interpretation of the 
Sharia, the Quran and words of God. The Jihad is an action, usually a violent 
one that targets the ones who do not follow the word of God or the infidels. 
Therefore, the Mujahid makes all possible efforts to follow the word of God 
and to enhance the prestige of Islam.  
Some Western authors and Middle-East scholars translate “Jihad” as 
“Holy War”. This translation is very problematic, as indicated by Roxanne 
L. Euben (Euben 2002). In fact, as noted by Bernard Lewis, in Classical 
Arabic there is no phrase equivalent to “Holy War” (Lewis 1988, 71). 
 
 
The Jihad in Islam 
 
The use of the term “Jihad” can be traced back to the time of Prophet 
Muhammad. The wars that the prophet declared or fought were considered 
Jihad, as they aimed to expand the boundaries of the Islamic State, and 
subsequently the Islamic empire, and to protect the state or empire from 
hostile attacks (Peters 1996, 1). 
For many centuries, the term “Jihad” has been used to designate the 
war against infidels, and for expanding “Dar al-Islam”. The practice of 
Jihad, however, took different forms throughout history, in light of the 
controversies and debates that the Islamic Empire had witnessed since the 
8th century A.D.  
With the rise of colonial empires such as Britain and France, the 
defensive and resistive meaning of Jihad gained an additional momentum 
by the work of reformers and thinkers who took a reformist approach to 
Islamic Fiqh (the Islamic Jurisprudence). Among those thinkers was Jamāl 
al-Dīn al-Afghānī. He argued that a state of peace and harmony is the 
natural condition that should prevail between Muslim states and the other 
religions, but Muslims are driven to defensive Jihad by European 
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colonialism (Peters 1996, 6). This reformist approach laid the ground for 
justifying resistance to colonialism throughout the Islamic world.  
In the 1950s and the 1960s a more radical and modernist conception 
of Jihad was developed by Islamic thinkers such as Sayyid Qutb in Egypt 
and al-Maudidi in Pakistan (Euben 2002, 378). These thinkers were inspired 
by the writings of Ibn-Taymiyyah from the 14th century. Ibn-Taymiyyah 
had issued Fatwas (religious ruling) that enabled Muslims to rebel against 
their leaders. These Fatwas also enabled Muslims to deem their leader 
infidel and declare Jihad against him, if he does not implement the Sharia'a 
properly in the state (Ibn Taymiyyah 2003, 298). Al-Maududi and Sayyid 
Qutb had revised these Fatwas and adapted them to the 20th century. They 
have become the main thinkers and founders of a new kind of Islamic and 
Jihadist fundamentalism in the Sunni World. To remove the last barrier 
standing in the way of Jihad against the Muslim leaders in Muslim states, 
such as Egypt, modernist Jihadists took an extreme step by declaring that 
although they were Muslims, these leaders were infidels (Peters 1996, 7).   
The Shiite and Orthodox Sunni movements in Islam significantly 
differ in their conception and practice of Jihad. The Sunni Muslims have 
used “Jihad” to refer to Islamic wars against the infidels, and their wars have 
taken a religious-Jihadist form, even when initiated by Muslims. The Shiite 
Ulama (the religious scholars), in contrast, were very prudent with their use 
of the term. On their view, only Prophet Muhammad or one of the twelve 
infallible Imams, who are the legitimate leaders of the Islamic Ummah 
(nation), have the authority to declare Jihad. As the twelfth Imam, Al-Imam 
al-Mahdi, is a “hidden Imam”, the Shiites maintain that the Muslims are no 
longer allowed to declare Jihad (Abedi & Legenhauseen 1986, 15). 
This, however, reflects only the position of the Shiite Ulama of to the 
Akhbari School, the conservative school of the Shiite Fiqh. The 
interpretations associated with the Ulama of the Ussuli School, in contrast, 
emphasize “Ijtihad al-Ulama”. According to this interpretation, the ban on 
the declaration of the Jihad in the absence of the hidden Imam applies only 
to offensive Jihad. But Muslims are obliged to defend themselves and to 
declare defensive Jihad when the Islamic Ummah or land is endangered or 
attacked by external forces (Peters 1996, 4). This position plays a crucial in 
the Islamist-Shiite interpretation of Muqawamah in the late twentieth 
century, as will be demonstrated later. This position, that allows for 
defensive Jihad, was adopted in the doctrine of the Iranian Revolution’s 
leader, Ayatollah Khomeini. His line of thought was similar to that of the 
Ussuli Ulama, and has transformed Jihad, in the guise of a defensive means 
against colonial forces and infidels, into an additional mainstay of Islamic 
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Unlike the concept of “Jihad”, the “Muqawamah” concept is not deeply 
embedded in Islamic history, nor does it appear in the Quran. The root of 
the word “Muqawamah” is . .ق.و.م The words that derive from this root have 
several meanings. Among the meanings of the noun “Qiyam” that derives 
from the same root are standing up (Ibn Manzur, "قوم" entry); resurrection, 
adherence and preservation of something (Ibid), and confrontation of the 
enemies to prevent them from achieving their goal. The meaning of the 
word “Muqawamah” is resistance.  
The concept of Muqawamah was not in circulation as a political idea 
until the 20th century. Even when the reformist Sheikh Jamāl al-Dīn al-
Afghānī wrote on colonialism in the 19th century and used the term, he 
used it in its technical sense that is closer to material-natural resistance and 
not as a political concept with broader cultural connotations and meanings 
(al-Afghani, 447). Al-Afghānī uses the term “Nuhud”, which also stands for 
“standing up” and “resurrection”; and in the period of Al-Afghānī’s 
writings, one of its direct connotations was the “An-Nahda” (the 
Renaissance) period in Europe, and later in other regions of the world. As a 
reformist cleric and one of the Islamic renaissance leaders, Al-Afghānī 
suggests that the colonized nations, mainly in the Islamic world, cannot 
achieve real renaissance (Nahdah) without Nuhud, that is, without 
confronting colonialism and terminating it.  
When Al-Afghānī refers to Islamic nations, he adds to the technical 
concept of “Muqawamah” (the one that is not informed by a comprehensive 
view of the society and culture where Muqawamah is imbedded) and to the 
broader concept of “Nuhud”, the concept of “Jihad”, which I have already 
addressed. He interprets “Jihad” as Muqawamah and Nuhud against all 
colonial forces. 
Michael Melstein maintains that the term “Resistance” emerged 
during World War II as a collective attribute of the clandestine 
organizations that operated in Europe against Nazi forces (Milstein 2009, 
21). These organizations contained different groups from France, the 
Balkans and the Soviet Union. Due to this historic background regarding 
the emergence of the term, the concept of “resistance” acquired a positive 
meaning in most languages, designating a struggle for achieving national 
liberation against rampant colonial forces. This may account for the fact that 
Muqawamah movements are usually considered more legitimate than 
originations that appeal to other terms of Islamic origin.  Milstein also 
outlines the geographic journey of the term. He notes that “The National 
Liberation Front”, founded in Algeria in the mid-1950s to struggle against 
French Colonialism, had been the main agent of the transition of “Al-
Muqawamah” (as a political term) from Europe into the North-African arena, 
and then into the Middle East (Ibid, 22). 
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Mu’een Ahmad Mahmoud also traces the roots of ‘resistance’ back 
to World War II, and specifically, with the operations of the Fedayeen in the 
Middle East. After World War II, the Algerian revolutionary forces and the 
Viet Cong in Southern Vietnam appropriated the concept of “resistance”. 
Subsequently, it also reached the Palestinian organizations that started 
operating in an organized way in the second half of the 1960s (Mahmoud 
1969, 24-34). 
Mahmoud, Milstein and others agree that the concept of 
“Muqawamah” became common in the Middle East as a result of 
propaganda efforts exerted by the Palestinian factions that started their 
systematic resistance operation in the mid 1960s. The defeat of the Arab 
regimes in the Six-Day-War in 1967 and their subsequent weakening 
enabled the Palestinian factions to free themselves to a certain extent from 
official Arab domination. Consequently, the concept associated with their 
activism grew more common. 
 
 
Muqawamah vs. Jihad 
 
As mentioned earlier, Muqawamah, unlike Jihad, is not a Quranic term. The 
term “Muqawamah”, in its current meaning, does not appear in the Quran. 
Nevertheless, the term is used to refer to different Islamic movements, and 
has become an integral part of their official name, as in the case of Hizballah 
in Lebanon and Hamas in Palestine. This secular term has replaced the term 
of Jihad, although the latter term has not been completely jettisoned by 
these movements. Rather, they have found a special doctrinal interpretation 
of Muaqawamah that has gradually substituted Jihad. 
Far from being an insignificant or merely cosmetic change, the shift 
from Jihad to Muqawamah marks the dramatic ideological change these 
movements went through. Specifically, the endorsement of Muqawamah is 
associated with openness and willingness to cooperate with national and 
religious partners who do not share these groups worldview.  
Hizballah is often considered the most prominent representative of the 
values of the Muqawamah movement, both in its communication with the 
different forces, be they religious or secular, and in leading the resistance 
against Israeli and Western occupation. By endorsing the concept of 
Muqawamah (in the guise of defensive Jihad, interpreted jurisprudentially), 
Hizballah is able to prioritizes common concerns over sectorial ones, both 
within Lebanon and in the Arab world as a whole.  
The Takfiri movements, in contrast, use Jihad to distinguish themselves 
from the rest of society, and to justify actions taken against those who 
disagree with their vision. These movements push Jihad to its extreme limit 
by confronting forces they regard as Pagan within the boundaries of the 
Islamic world. This strategy is readily apparent in the Syrian war.  
Subsequently, Islamic and secular movements that raise the banner of 
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Muqawamah, in its comprehensive sense, and turn it into a strategic goal and 
an axis of different alliances with internal and external forces, are able to 
present themselves as tolerant, and as subscribing to a national, patriotic 
and Islamic vision which acknowledges the diversity in the Middle-East. 
These forces also represent themselves as promoting the mobility of the 
region’s people, regardless of their religious, sectarian, social or national 
identity.  
As for the movements that raise the banner of internal Jihad, they first 
alienate themselves from large sections of society; later on, they even 
denounce society as a whole, which they deemed “pagan”. They seek to 
destroy these societies in order to build a utopian Islamic society that draws 
its laws from their interpretation of Islamic Shari’a. According to Cook, for 
these movements, “the more pressing issue was the nature of the society 
that was to be liberated from foreign rule” (Cook 2005, 105).  
 
 
The Roots of Hizballah's Muqawamah: Karbala 
 
The murder of Imam Husayn and his family members was the formative 
event that set Shiite narrative as one of marginalization, and has led the 
Shiites to raise the banner of justice against tyrants. The Imam was 
assassinated on 10 October 680, together with his family members and 
seventy-two associates, including his sons and siblings, who were all on 
their way to Kufa, Iraq.  
Following the death of Muʿawiyah, the first Umayyad caliph, his son 
Yazīd was made a caliph by inheritance. Yazīd‘s renouncment of Islamic 
morality gave rise to a bitter controversy among the Islamic nation 
regarding his right to rule, and the residents of Kufa invited Husayn to their 
city to declare him Caliph (Momen 1985, 28). Upon their arrival to Karbalāʾ, 
Imam Husayn and his family ran into the army of Yazīd, which consisted 
of thirty-two thousand soldiers, according to some sources (Al-Haydari 
1999, 91). On the Day of ʿĀshūrāʾ, the tenth day of Muharram in the Islamic 
calendar, the forces of Yazīd killed Husayn and his companions, including 
women and children (Momen 1985, 30-31). 
For centuries, the Shiites have sought to instill this atrocious tragedy 
of the Prophet’s grandson as the founding myth in Shiite doctrine. They 
detached the “Martyrdom of Husayn” from its historical context, and 
transformed it into a symbol: “every day is ʿĀshūrāʾ, and every land is 
Karbalāʾ”.  ʿĀshūrāʾ and Karbalāʾ have transcended their historical 
parameters, and have become an integral part of the Shiite ideology of 
resistance. 
However, the Shiite interpretation of the martyrdom (Istishhad) of the 
third Imam has changed and developed over the years. Generally speaking, 
one could refer to two main interpretations of the founding event in the 
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history of the Shiʿa Islam: a passive-conservative interpretation of 
repentance, and an active revolutionary interpretation. The passive-
conservative interpretation has been the dominating interpretation for 
many years. Karbalāʾ and ʿ Āshūrāʾ rituals, in which the story of the murder 
of Imam Husayn is retold, were long weeping ceremonies for Shiite 
believers. This weeping is mainly directed inwards to enhance the believer’s 
feelings of guilt, weakness and fear. It is coupled with striving to abolish 
the original sin, manifested through the disregard of the necessity of 
assisting Imam Husayn in his confrontation with the forces of Yazīd, and 
abandoning the former, the Prophet’s grandson, to meet his bitter fate.   
Clergy and new activist frameworks that appeared on scene in the 
mid-20th century have introduced a change in the interpretation of the 
ritual. They aimed to channel the tremendous energies hoarded in ʿᾹshūrāʾ 
and in the attempts to comprehend the historical and mythical event that 
happened to the third Imam in early Islam toward a contemporary socio-
political activism. This activist interpretation of the Shiite narrative of 
Karbalāʾ events has emphasized the strong will of Imam Husayn to reach 
Karbalāʾ and confront the army of Yazīd, although he knew that he and his 
family were destined to martyrdom. The purpose of this loss was to realize 
the divine plan that strives for “the triumph of blood over the sword” 
(Dabashi 2011, 80). Husayn has become a symbol of resistance by the 
wretched of the earth. Although he and his family were defeated and 
massacred, his commemoration and the myth that he consolidated upon his 
death have preserved the “true faith” and showed the world the 
significance of resistance and martyrdom, that can overcome human evil, 
embodied in different “Yazīds” throughout history.  
 Through these rituals, ʿᾹshūrāʾ and Karbalāʾ would change from 
historical events into an integral and immutable part of the Shiite collective 
memory. This understanding of collective memory is line with Guy 
Rocher’s: 
 
The collective memory is not necessarily the historians’ history, 
although it would be a source of inspiration. The past should be 
simplified, summarized, pruned, deformed and transformed into a 
myth; that is what symbolism is meant for. It suffices to list some 
names of superheroes surrounded by the halo of the myth; it 
suffices to refer to dates and places saturated with memories, and 
to some deformed events.    
The collective memory, both tangible and deformed, is the 
most powerful element that enhances mutual social responsibility; 
and the symbols it uses are filled with meanings and interpretations 
(Cited in Rizqallah 1977, 118-119). 
 
Karbalāʾ and ʿᾹshūrāʾ have become an irrefutable myth. They provided 
dissidents and revolutionaries of coming generations with revolutionary 
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fuel, as understood by George Sorel. Sorel maintains that the significance of 
myths lies in the fact that they are irrational means for mass mobilization 
toward political activism, replacing rational ideas (Sternhell 1992, 93). 
 The renewed interpretation of ʿᾹshūrāʾ was also inspired by 
Khomeini, who took an additional step forward and transformed the 
interpretation of ʿᾹshūrāʾ from “lamentation” and repentance into a 
militant revolutionary political project, directed against oppressive regimes 
and global imperialism. In his book Nahḍat ʻĀshūrā’, he writes: 
 
Do not think that these funerals and these convoys aim towards a 
ceremony of weeping over the Master of Martyrs. The Master of 
Martyrs does not need this weeping ceremony; and this ceremony 
does not lead to any activism. The significance of these assemblies 
lies in mass gatherings and in the target they are all heading to.2 
 
He adds elsewhere that: 
 
What matters in ʿᾹshūrāʾ is the political dimension, the appeal to 
Allah and the concentration of the masses on one point and on one 
goal. This is what mobilizes the people for the Islamic cause… what 
matters is the political dimensions that the believers had planned 
for from the dawn of Islam to guarantee its sustainability. It is about 
holding the same banner to achieve the same goal (Ibid). 
 
Khomeini accordingly opines that the aim of ʿᾹshūrāʾ is to mobilize the 
masses to resist oppressive forces, even when these forces are stronger or 
outnumber the believers: 
 
Imam Husayn (peace be upon him) taught people not to fear the 
quantity, for it is not the essence. What really matters is the quality, 
and the way one should confront the enemies and fight against 
them. This is the essence and the path towards achieving the goals 
(Ibid).   
 
Khomeini’s interpretation of ʿᾹshūrāʾ and of the revolt of Imam Husayn 
means that the believers’ victory is inevitable. If they defeat the enemy in 
the battle, they will be victors in this world and the world to come. If they 
lose the current battle, their loss will also be deemed a victory, because they 
will be martyrs and will go to heaven, and will be commemorated as 
advocates of righteousness and justice. Throughout history, Husayn has 
been always remembered and glorified although he lost, while Yazīd has 
                                                          
2 Khomeini, Nahdat Ashura, http://www.imamkhomeini.com/web1/Arabic/showitem 
.aspx?cid=2189&h=19&f=20&pid=2525, last visited on 27.08.2018. 
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been forgotten. He might have won that battle, but Yazīd lost the war over 
his place in history.  
 Khomeini asserted the great potential that lies in Shiʿa as a source of 
resistance and insubordination. He subscribed to the interpretations 
developed by nonreligious Shiite intellectuals, such Ali Shariʿati and his 
teacher Jalal Al-e-Ahmad (an ex-Communist who joined forces with 
religious parties and adopted potent Iranian nationalist views, (Halm 2011, 
137). Being a respected clergyman, Khomeini endowed the interpretations 
of these Shiite intellectuals and reformists with religious legitimacy, 
transforming them into a powerful and revolutionary means of resistance 
for organization like Hizballah.  
 Hizballah’s conception of Muqawamah draws heavily on this active 
interpretation of Shiʿa Islam.  In el-Husseini’s apt words, "with Hizballah 
the Karbala paradigm becomes resistance against the oppressor/occupier 
rather than revolt against the ruler" (el-Husseini 2010, 805). As Abisaab 
&Abisaab note, the association between Karbala, Palestine and resistance 
“has run deep in southern culture and over time has been articulated by 
secular nationalists, leftists and more recently Islamists” (Abisaab & 
Abisaab 2014, 135). Therefore, the organization could easily reconcile its 
religious roots with its resistance project that served both as a goal and as 
an essential component of the organization’s identity. This active 
interpretation of Shiʿa Islam, adopted by Hizballah, places a special 
emphasis on other unifying foundations that will prepare the ground for 
different anti-imperialist forces in the region, and will serve as a common 
ground for negotiation, even with Christian parties and other groups that 
support the liberation theology. 
Hizballah's unique conception of Muqawamah could not have 
developed without the cultivation of its ideological background by thinkers 
such as Musa al-Sadr, Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah, Ruhollah Khomeini 
and Ali Shariati. Fadlallah's conception of Muqawamah was integrated in his 
sermons in a mosque in South-West Beirut, during the Civil War and 
especially during the Israeli Invasion of Lebanon in 1982.  In these sermons, 
collected and published under the heading "Al-Muqawamah al-
Islamiyyah", Fadlallah provided the Shiites in Lebanon, especially the 
young militants who have experienced the radicalization process of their 
community, with religious authorization of their Muqawamah against Israeli 
occupation. Fadlallah also gave there a detailed analysis of Muqawamah's 
activism and the Shahada (Martyrdom) of the Muqawimon (those who resist). 
He considering Shahada to be a rational action and not a product of 
"brainwashing", so long as it is conducive to the goal of defeating the 
occupier (Fadlallah 2000, 42-43). 
The significant contribution of Fadlallah was his definition of al-
Muqawamah as a large-scale project that is not limited to resistance 
operations against the Israeli occupation in Southern Lebanon. He 
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presented Muqawamah as an Islamic and universal project within which all 
oppressed populations, Muslim and non-Muslim alike, could act together 
as one (Ibid, 18). He spoke of Muqawamah as an inclusive universal and 
Islamic project, under which all the Mustaḍʿafoun (‘the downtrodden’), 
both Muslims and non-Muslims, can operate.  As he explains: 
 
We do not want to be only an Islamic Muqawamah that operates 
only in the South.  We strive to be an Islamic Muqawamah in the 
Islamic world and among the wretched peoples of the Third World. 
(cited in Sankari, 2008, 317) 
 
Fadlallah's view integrates the thought of Ruhollah Khomeini and Dr. 
Ali Shariati, who maintained that Islam is the real comprehensive and 
revolutionary ideology, through which one can liberate disempowered 
populations across the globe. This view allowed Hizballah at a later stage 
to shape the Muqawamah project, which engaged not only the Shiite, but 
various actors within Lebanese society. 
Despite Fadlallah’s continuous attempts to differentiate himself from 
Hizballah and to emphasize that he is not the organization’s spiritual 
leader, it is evident that he exerted a remarkable influence on it. Fadlallah’s 
openness and tolerance, for instance, paved the way for some of the changes 
that the organization went through.  
Despite his enthusiasm and support of the Islamic Iranian revolution, 
Fadlallah insisted that such a revolution could not occur in Lebanon 
because of this small country’s demographic diversity. He therefore did not 
believe in the possibility of establishing an Islamic state in Lebanon in the 
foreseeable future. Instead, he argued that Lebanon must become a “Man 
State” (Dawlat al-Insan) before it could turn into an Islamic state, which 
according to Fadlallah and his supporters, is the ideal state. This ‘Man State’ 
would abolish sectarianism, and respect all human beings equally, whoever 
and wherever they are, regardless of their religious beliefs. (Ibid, 353-357). 
 
 
Hizballah’s Emergence: From Jihad to Muqawamah 
 
The first few years following Hizballah’s foundation witnessed the civil war 
on the one hand, and the Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon on the other. 
In addition, the Islamic revolution in Iran proved to be successful, and had 
a significant impact on Shiite communities outside Iran, especially in 
Lebanon. This impact led Hizballah, in its early days, to adopt an 
uncompromising, radical Jihadist approach, an approach that was also 
apparent in the part’s official name: “Hizballah: the Islamic Revolution in 
Lebanon”. As is implicit by this name, and as was later made explicit in 
Hizballah’a messages to the Lebanese people and to the whole world, the 
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party intended to develop a revolutionary plan to overthrows the Falangist 
regime, that the organization regarded as illegitimate. 
The revolutionary atmosphere into which Hizballah was born proved 
to be the most influential factor in shaping the movement’s national and 
political vision. The movement intended to overthrow the current regime 
and to establish a new one. According to Hizballah’s first public message, 
this new regime will not include the Falangist and the other Right-Christian 
movements that had cooperated with Israel in its invasion of Lebanon and 
with the Western colonial countries, particularly the USA and France. In 
this "Open Letter", Hizballah asserts that its main goal is to overthrow the 
existing regime. Although this letter argues that the most appropriate 
regime would be an Islamic regime, modeled after the Islamic Republic of 
Iran, it also calls upon all Lebanese people to elect the regime that they find 
suitable. 
Hizballah has always perceived the non-Muslim Lebanese as an 
integral part of the nation. Nevertheless, the origination also considered 
them to be inferior to Muslims and encouraged them to convert to Islam so 
that they would enjoy blissful living on earth and in the afterlife. This 
approach is apparent in a declaration given by Ibrahim Amin Essayed, one 
of Hizballah’s leaders and founders, at the occasion of the ninth anniversary 
of the Islamic revolution in Iran, in 1988: 
 
The Muslim people in Lebanon refuse to be part of the political 
project of others (the Lebanese state with the Maronite hegemony) 
that serve the interests of the Maronite president. Instead, the others 
should find themselves a place within the Islamic project.(Al-A'hd 
12 Februar 1988) 
 
After the Lebanese civil war had ended in 1989, Taif agreement had been 
signed, and Khomeini had passed away, Hizballah’s political and national 
vision went through some significant changes. Some scholars deem these 
changes pragmatic steps taken to maintain the organization’s legitimacy in 
the new Lebanese state (Azani 2009, 246), while others take them to be 
natural changes, rooted in Hizballah’s original Islamic-Lebanese agenda 
(Jousef Al-Agha 2006) and (Sa'ad-Ghrayeb 2002). But regardless of our 
understanding of these changes, there is no denying that Hizballah and its 
theorists have made a long way towards changing their vision and 
conception of Lebanese nationalism. This gradual change eventually led to 
change the organization’s title from an Islamic party (for the Shiite sect) into 
a Lebanese nationalist party, with an Islamic vision.  
In the years that followed the signing of the Taif agreement, and 
especially in 1992, Hizballah stood at a crossroads. It could either continue 
its rebellion against the Lebanese state and overthrow it, or it could 
integrate itself into the Lebanese political game and try to bring about the 
desired change in the Lebanese regime from within the parliament, and not 
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from without, as was the case during the civil war and the 
revolutionary/Jihadi period of Hizballah in its early days. The group that 
favored integration was headed by Hassan Nasrallah, the third Secretary 
General of the organization. The more radical group, that opposed 
integration, was headed by the first Secretary General of the organization, 
Sheikh Subhi al-Tufayli. Internal and external factors, including the political 
change that took place in the Iranian leadership following the death of 
Khomeini (Assadallahi 2004), have led Hizballah to seek the ruling of Al- 
Wali Al-Faqih (Islamic jurist), Khamenei. The ruling was in favor of the 
group that supported integration into the parliamentary elections.  
Hizballah’s transformation from a revolutionary opponent to the 
political regime of the Lebanese state into an active participant in the 
political system (albeit in a limited manner, at the very beginning) affected 
the party’s national vision and its political and strategic attitude toward the 
Lebanese state and its internal partners. Subsequently, it changed its name 
into Hizballah: The Islamic Resistance in Lebanon. The resistance became the 
main agenda of this organization. And despite its militaristic connotations, 
the party’s leadership later on emphasized that resistance is not limited to 
a purely-military strategy. 
Naim Qassem, the deputy-secretary of Hizballah, defined the 
Muqawamah of the party as a “social world-view in every dimension”:  
 
A military, cultural, political and communicative Muqawamah… 
That is why we have always called for building a Muqawamah 
society and will never be satisfied with a Muqawamah group. The 
Muqawama society contains its own continuity, while the activism 
of the Muqawamah group is temporary. 
 
Qassem contrasts here between two conceptions of Muqawamah: as a 
temporary strategy, carried out by a Muqawamah group, and as ongoing 
social project, that requires a Muqawamah society. Hizballah's project, he 
argues, is that of building a long-lasting society, in which Muqawamah 
engages society as whole, rather than limiting it to an elite avant-garde or 
an isolated militia, the “Muqawama group”.   
Following the Taif agreement, Hizballah has undergone a remarkable 
transformation. This transformation is reflected in the organization’s 
approach to the main pillars of its ideology, including: 
• The Islamic State: in its early stages, Hizballah regarded the Quran 
as the constitution of the Islamic nation, and Islam as the system of 
religion and state. Accordingly, it called Muslims across the globe to 
struggle, using all legitimate means, for the enforcement of Islamic 
law. At these early stage, Hizballah also regarded the political 
regime, dominated by the Maronite politicians, as a pagan regime. 
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Later on, however, Hizballah has started redirecting its bayonets at 
the political sectarianism into Sunnis and Shiites, and called for 
reforming the political system by eliminating political sectarianism, 
as defined by the new Lebanese constitution. The party maintained 
that Muqawamah is a national project, because struggling against 
external intervention and internal fragmentation is the only way to 
form a strong Lebanese state, capable of protecting its citizens 
regardless of their religious and ideological affiliations.  
The organization went as far as justifying intervention in Syrian 
affairs, by appeal to its alleged-role as the protector of Lebanon and 
the other groups that maintain Lebanese uniqueness. This position 
was defended by Nasrallah, in a speech he gave at 18.10.2015:  
 
The Muqawamah protects all the nations of this region - the 
Christians, the Sunnis, the Shiites and the minorities; it 
protects the right of partnership and freedom of opinion3 
 
• The relationship with Christians: At first, Hizballah was strongly 
opposed to submission to a Christian regime. It aimed at preventing 
Christians from taking part in the government, regarding them as 
Ahl al-Dhimmah (“protected people”) who should eventually be 
given social and religious rights, but not political rights. After the 
Taif agreement, however the Christians have become Hizballah’s 
partners. Hizballah’s electoral lists included Christian candidates, 
and some were even Maronite. The Memorandum of Understanding 
that Hizballah signed in 2006 with the Free Patriotic Movement, 
headed by the Maronite former army commander (and the current 
president of Lebanon) Michel ‘Aoun, testifies to the transformation 
of Hizballah’s approach toward Christians. An unpromising 
religious discourse was substituted for an open and inclusive one, 
and Hizballah was willing to cooperate with them in governance. In 
other words, Hizballah has substituted a “Jihadist” discourse that 
excludes other members of the nation for a Muqawamah discourse 
that is mainly concerned with national partnership that stands 
against the external enemy. This approach is apparent in the 
organization’s political manifesto: 
The consensual democracy represents a proper political 
formula to assure true partnership and contributes in 
                                                          
3 http://www.alalam.ir/news/1750378 (last visited on 27.08.2018). 
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opening the doors for everyone to join the phase of building 
the reassuring state (Hizballah 2009) 4. 
 
Hizballah has therefore dramatically changed its approach to 
Christians in Lebanon. From regarding them as members of a 
religious minority, it acknowledged them as citizens with equal 
rights. But until an ideal state of equal rights to all citizens would be 
established, the organization will settle for a state with equal rights 
to all sects.  
• Flexibility and tolerance: Al-Agha maintains that Hizballah had 
first believed in the need to liberate Lebanon from the Maronite 
political chains and from the sectarian political regime that is based 
on man-made laws and constitutions (al-Agha 2008). Over the years, 
however, Hizballah has come to accept these laws, and even 
participated in lawmaking through its parliamentary members.  
In addition to these changes, one could note Hizballah’s use of 
patriotic Lebanese symbols. With time, the party has started to raise 
the Lebanese flag and to play the Lebanese national anthem, 
alongside the party’s anthem, in its official events and activities. 
Through these symbolic gestures Hizballah asserts its Lebanese 
patriotism, thereby distinguishing itself from “Jihadist” movements. 
This change of attitude toward the Lebanese nation-state is explicit 
in Hasan Nasrallah’s speeches to the cadres of the party: 
 
Hezbollah has changed and its priorities have changed 
based on circumstances […] There was a time when we used 
to see Lebanon as a colonial construct that was part of the 
Ummah […] That was in our early days, and the country 
was going through a Civil War. All parties were calling for 
a Nation that fits their liking […] Today conditions have 
changed. We believe that this country is our country, and 
that the flag of the cedar is our flag that we need to protect, 
too. At this stage, our priority is to protect the state in 
Lebanon and to build it. (cited in Daher, 2016, 167)    
 
 
Muqawamah as a National Project: “Al-Wathiqa as-Siyassiyah” 
 
More evidence for the change in Hizballah’s approach to national and 
patriotic ideas are found in the political manifesto issued by the 
organization in 2009. This manifesto testifies to the shift from a purely 
                                                          
4 The version of the document is taken from Hizballah's website: https://www.Moqa 
wama.org/essaydetailsf.php?eid=16245&fid=47 (accessed on 27.08.2018)  
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Jihadist ideology, that characterizes Takfiri Jihadist movements, into a 
resistance-based ideology. Moreover, the 2009 manifesto lacks much of the 
religious Islamic visions that appeared in Hizballah’s writings during the 
civil war. In this later manifesto, Hizballah refers to “the people”, without 
placing a special emphasis on Muslims, or excluding any group.  
This change can also be made apparent by comparing between the use 
of the terms “Muqawamah” and “Jihad” in the political manifesto of 2009 and 
their use in the "Open Letter" of 19855. In the "Open Letter", the term 
“Muqawamah” appears 18 times and “Jihad" appears ten times; in contrast, 
in the manifesto “Muqawamah” appears 52 times, and “Jihad” appears only 
seven times. 
In the introduction to the 2009 political manifesto, “al-Wathiqa As-
Siyassiyah”, Hizballah's prepares the ground for the integration of the Left, 
the father of resistance in Lebanon. The “Jihadist discourse” is traded for a 
“Muqawamah discourse”, along with a quasi-Marxist analysis of the global 
economic crisis of the Capitalist system, and the impact of this crisis on the 
United States and Israel:  
 
What deepens even more the international hegemony system crisis 
are the collapses in the international and US financial markets and 
the fall of the US economy in a situation of failure. This gives a clear 
expression of the peak of the structural crisis of the arrogant 
capitalist sample. Therefore, it's possible to say that we are amid 
historical transformations that signal the retreat of the US role as a 
predominant power and the fall of the arrogant uniloparism and 
the beginning of hastening historic demise of the Zionist entity. The 
resistance movements stand at the heart of these international 
transformations and emerge as a strategic factor in the international 
scene after performing a central role in producing or promoting 
these transformations in our region. (Hizballah 2009) 
 
In this document, Hizballah points out to the role of the different resistance 
movements, united by their resistance to imperialist hegemony and US 
domination. Therefore, and in contrast with its early dichotomous 
approach, the organization defines itself not merely as an Islamic or 
patriotic movement, but also as an integral part of the marginalized forces 
across the globe that resist the tyranny of Israel and the United States. 
Hizballah’s reference here to Lebanon’s foreign relations is of utmost 
importance. The organization reminds the European countries of the 
“resistance history of some of them”, in order to justify the project of 
“Lebnan al-Muqawamah” which the organization attempts to build: 
 
Europe holds responsibility for the damage it has caused due to the 
colonial “inheritance” it has left behind - the consequences and 
                                                          
5 The version of the document is taken from Joseph al-Agha 2008. 
Journal of the Irish Society for the Academic Study of Religions 6 






results of which our people still suffer from. Since some European 
people have a history of resisting the occupier, Europe’s ethical and 
humanitarian duty - before being a political duty - is to 
acknowledge the right of the people to resist the occupier, on the 
bases of distinguishing between resistance and terrorism. 
(Hizballah 2009) 
 
Hizballah not only refer to European countries as potential partners 
for Hizballah and the Muqawamah project in Lebanon, in light of their 
history of resistance; it also sketches a map of potential cooperative 
relationships with liberation and resistance forces worldwide, especially in 
Latin American countries:  
 
 We look at the experience of independence and liberation that 
rejects hegemony in the countries of Latin America with a lot of 
respect, attention, and appreciation. We see vast intersection 
platforms between their project and the project of resistance 
movements in our region, which leads to constructing a more just 
and balanced international system. (Hizballah 2009) 
 
Hizballah’s renewed identity reflected in this political document is not 
completely new, for it is largely based on the 1985 document. This more 
recent document, however, demonstrates the ideological 
institutionalization of the organization and its transformation from a small 
organization deeply concentrated on military activism in the eighties, into 
a large and branching out one, that enjoys considerable status at the local 
and regional levels, in the early 21st century.  
In the “Open Letter” of 1985, Hizballah addresses the countries that 
oppose American hegemony, and calls them to join the religion of truth (Dīn 
al-Haq), namely Islam. (Hizballah 1985) However, in al-Wathiqa al-
Siyassiya, Hizballah abstains from an appeal to Islam. It rather calls upon 
the countries and groups opposing American hegemony to act on the basis 
of the common interests and mutual respect for the ideology and unique 
nature of each group.  
“Al-Wathiqa as-Siyassiya” thus introduces Hizballah’s new order of 
priorities, and its accomplishments at the different levels. The document is 
comprised of four chapters: the first, “Hegemony and Revival”, includes an 
analysis of the current global power relations and of the dominant 
American hegemony. The discourse in this chapter is explicitly a 
revolutionary discourse pertaining to the Third World, in which resistance 
to American hegemony and its metastasis, Israel, is not justified on religious 
grounds, but rather by a “materialistic analysis” of the motives of this 
hegemony. 
In the second part, the organization refers to Muqawamah in a “broad 
sense”. It proceeds from a specific and more significant reference to the new 
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project, not only from Hizballah’s perspective, to a broader project. The 
opening paragraph concerns the homeland: 
 
Lebanon is our homeland and the homeland of our ancestors, 
descendants and the future generations. It is the homeland for 
whom we had sacrificed our dearest sons to protect its sovereignty 
and dignity, and to liberate its lands. We want a homeland that 
pertains to all the Lebanese people; a homeland that embraces them 
all and thrives through the achievements and contributions of its 
sons. We want a comprehensively united country, with its lands, 
people and institutions, and we shall stand against all explicit or 
concealed attempts towards fragmentation. We want a sovereign, 
strong, free and independent homeland that plays a major role in 
the regional arena, and contributes to the formation of the present 
and the future, as it has contributed to the formation of the past. 
(Hizballah 2009) 
 
This text is a radical development in the organization’s approach, no to say 
a denouncement of the discourse of the “Open Letter”, which had totally 
disregarded the Lebanese homeland and referred only to the nation of 
Islam, “whose pioneers gained victory in Iran, with the Help of God” 
(Hizballah 1985). Immediately thereafter, “al-Wathiqa” refers to the 
Muqawamah that is interwoven in the homeland, and that gains legitimacy 
from its being national-Arab-Lebanese, rather than religious-Islamic-Shiite. 
The third part discusses the state and the regime that should govern 
it, with no mention of Islamic regime. This, however, does not mean that an 
Islamic regime is not part of Hizballah's long-term vision. The fourth part 
deals with the Lebanese-Palestinian context, especially the Palestinian 
refugees in Lebanon. In this context too, the organization’s analysis and 
discourse is not religious. It rather appeals to human rights, to the Arabism 
of both the Lebanese and Palestinian people, and to their pertinence to the 
Muqawamah camp.   
The fifth part of the second chapter deals with Hizballah's attitude 
toward other Arab countries. It first alludes, however, to the precedence of 
Pan-Arabism over Pan-Islamism. Hizballah provides nationalist 
justifications for Lebanon’s integration into the Arab surrounding, and for 
its active involvement in the national Israeli-Arab conflict, as defined by the 
organization. This attitude is utterly different to the decrying discourse of 
the “Open Letter”, in which the organization referred to the “so-called 
Israeli-Arab conflict”, because it regarded it as a religious rather than a 
national conflict. 
In the sixth part, Hizballah defines the organizing principles of 
Lebanon’s attitude towards the Islamic world. This is another significant 
difference from the “Open Letter”, on which Lebanon is an integral part of 
the Islamic world, and which adopted an “Islamic nationhood” approach 
that rejects national borders as dividing the Islamic nation. Also in the sixth 
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part, Hizballah refers to the need to maintain pluralism in the “Arab Orient” 
(al-Mashriq al-ʿArabi) and to stop the ongoing immigration called “Nazeef” 
(bleeding) of Christians from this orient to the West. The organization 
emphasizes that this minority is an integral part of the Arab Orient in 
Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Palestine.  
Another key difference is Hizballah’s approach to Iran. While the 
Open Letter’s aggressive and enthusiastic tone hardly differentiates 
between Lebanon and Iran, treating them as two regions in the broader 
Islamic nation and as an integral part of true Islam, about a quarter of a 
century later, the organization’s approach to Iran in “al-Wathiqa” is not 
religious. Iran is considered a partner to the resistance movement against 
global and imperialist hegemony. Such a position could be adopted by any 
moderate Lebanese citizen; or, at the very least, this non-religious approach 
to Iran is unlikely to arouse essentialist religious or sectarian objections”. 
Indeed, such non-religious discourse demonstrates very clearly Hizballah’s 
rejection not merely of fundamentalist-Jihadist movements, but also a 





I have argued above that there are two major ideological trends within the 
Islamic movements currently operating in the middle-east. The first trend, 
Jihad, is based on the modernist approach that was developed by thinkers 
such as Qutb and al-Mawdoudi. According to this approach, the "Islamic 
pagan societies" must be overthrown by a revolution. This kind of approach 
does not tolerate other views or any other interpretations of the true belief, 
which is Islam. It also rejects any kind of compromise with other religions 
and sects within Islamic societies. 
The other trend, Muqawamah, has been led by Hizballah in Lebanon in 
the last two decades. Muqawamah seeks to synthesize defensive Jihad as it 
was interpreted by some of the Shiite Scholars (Foqaha) with secular 
Muqawamah, in the patriotic-leftist tradition. Hizballah provides us with an 
example of an Islamic Muqawamah movement, that claims to defend the 
Lebanese spirit and the Arab and Islamic spirit. Hizballah’s interpretation 
of Islamic spirit, however, is a pluralistic and tolerant one. 
By emphasizing the Muqawamah discourse over the discourse of 
Jihad, Hizballah seeks to bridge over the gaps between different 
organizations, political-religious movements and other parties and sects in 
Lebanon in particular, and in the region in general. The Muqawamah 
discourse thus serves to unite different groups, sects and ideologies in 
Lebanon and the middle east against common outside enemies. 
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